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Abstract
Many philosophers contend that selfhood involves a uniquely first-personal experiential dimension, which precedes any form 
of socially dependent selfhood. In this paper, I do not wish to deny the notion of such a “minimal” experiential dimension as 
encapsulating the very givenness of experience as for a certain subject, such that experiences are accessible to this subject 
in a way that they are not for others. However, I do wish to deny any temptation to view minimal experiential selfhood as 
ontogenetically more primitive than socially constituted selfhood. That is, the ‘thinnest’ construal of minimal experiential 
selfhood fails to properly account for characteristics that are essential to human selfhood; namely, the intimate, embodied 
interactions that unfold at the incipient moments of human life. I argue that taking the ontogenesis of embodied human 
existence seriously involves accepting the de facto equiprimordiality of minimal experientialiasm with a ‘minimal’ form of 
relational selfhood, i.e. the co-constitution of experience through engagements with others.
Keywords Minimal selfhood · Social constitution · Embodiment · Shared experience · Mother–infant interaction
1 Introduction
In recent years, numerous philosophers have contended that 
selfhood involves a uniquely subjective experiential dimen-
sion (Gallagher 2005; Legrand 2007; Strawson 1994, 2009; 
Kriegel 2009; Nida-Rümelin 2017). Central to this stance 
is the idea that one’s minimal experiential self precedes 
any form of socially dependent selfhood, encompassing 
social construction theories (Mead 1972; Foucault 1990), 
the linguistic construction of a self-narrative (Bruner 2003; 
Rudd 2012; Schechtman 2011), the normative constitution 
of cultural mores (Korsgaard 2009; Markus and Kitayama 
1991), or developmental psychological dependence on oth-
ers (Vygotsky 1986). Zahavi (2005, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2016, 
2017, 2018) is perhaps the main proponent of this stance 
and it is thus his characterisation of minimal experiential 
selfhood, as prior to any social dimension of selfhood, that 
will be targeted in this paper.
For Zahavi, minimal experiential selfhood is interchange-
ably construed as the “for-me-ness” (2014, p. 22), “self-
givenness” (2005, p. 12) or “pre-reflective self-awareness” 
(ibid., p. 61) of experience. The heart of these descriptions 
is that consciousness involves an inalienable subjective 
dimension, in the sense that experiences are given to a sub-
ject—and thereby accessible to her—in a way that they are 
not for others. My experiences, for instance, are always for 
me, in that I am directly aware of them while no one else 
is. The ‘minimalism’ of this dimension of consciousness 
lies in the fact that it does not require reflecting on one’s 
consciousness, nor does it involve objectifying one’s self, 
nor does it bring into awareness oneself as an experiencer. 
Instead, it is merely the unique acquaintance that one has 
with one’s experiences, outwith any entailment of reflection 
or positing of an egological ‘I’. In other words, minimal 
experiential selfhood is not reflective awareness of one’s self, 
but the ineliminable (pre-reflective) awareness of the very 
fact of being conscious. That is, for all experience, regard-
less of specific features of intentionality or phenomenal 
content, “whatever it is like for me to have this experience, 
it is for me that it is like to have it” (Zahavi 2014, p. 19). A 
basic subjectivity—‘for-me-ness’—is thus inherent in the 
very nature of experience (hence the ‘experiential’ aspect 
of minimal experiential selfhood). As we will come to see 
in Sect. 2, such subjectivity, as implied by the description 
of ‘for-me-ness’, is not anonymous, but allows for a first-
personal distinction of one experiential life from another. 
If, following Sartre (2003) and Zahavi (2014, pp. 11–12), 
‘self’ is identified with the subject of experience, and there is 
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a non-anonymous, phenomenologically minimal subjectiv-
ity to all experience, then for-me-ness equates to a minimal 
form of selfhood (Zahavi 2005, 2015, 2018).
As a precursor to my argument in this paper, it should be 
made clear that I do not wish to deny the in-built presence 
of this minimal experiential selfhood. Nor do I wish to deny 
that this for-me-ness is a necessary condition for conscious-
ness. What I do wish to deny is any temptation to view this 
minimal experiential selfhood as “ontogenetically more 
primitive” (Zahavi 2014, p. 14) than socially constituted 
selfhood.1 Human selfhood, I will argue, also necessarily 
involves the foundation of intimate interactions with others 
and the social world. These interactions dynamically (co-)
constitute one’s experience and amount to a foundational, 
or ‘minimal’, form of relational selfhood. Crucially, such 
foundational sociality extends to the very earliest recognis-
able occurrences of human conscious life, so that we are, in 
short, social beings through and through.
To this end, I will explain that the ‘thinnest’ construal of 
minimal experiential selfhood, as described by Zahavi, fails 
to properly acknowledge the pervasive presence of socially 
constituted embodiment, which is essential to human self-
hood. My plan is to emphasise the co-presence of minimal 
experiential selfhood with the constitutive involvement of 
others at the incipient moments of human life, such that over 
and above the worldly content of experience and the inten-
tional modality of experience, the phenomenality of many 
experiential states is socially constituted in a fundamental 
manner.
The paper’s key claim—that the most minimal form of 
experiential selfhood (i.e. for-me-ness) in humans is equip-
rimordial with socially constituted experiences, insofar 
as neither is developmentally prior to the other—will be 
unpacked across three stages. Firstly, I will further outline 
Zahavi’s specific notion of minimal experiential selfhood 
that this paper will be concerned with. Secondly, I will put 
forward the view that taking the ontogenesis of embodied 
human selfhood seriously involves accepting the de facto 
equiprimordiality of minimal experiential selfhood with 
co-constituted, other-dependent selfhood. In support of this 
view, I will draw on work by Krueger (2013, 2015) to show 
that early stages of human life, inclusive of the perspective 
of phenomenal consciousness, involve shared experiential 
states, in which one’s experiences are constitutively depend-
ent on the modulatory role of others. One’s corporeality is 
thereby partly given over to another’s agency. Lastly, these 
kinds of experiential states will be shown to be present at the 
most incipient moments of human life, thereby affirming that 
any naturalistically grounded notion of pre-reflective human 
minimal selfhood should be construed as ontogenetically 
equiprimordial with socially constituted experience. Such 
socially constituted experience amounts to a form of mini-
mal relational selfhood, which is not preceded by any other 
dimension of selfhood within the manifestation of human 
life.
2  Minimal Experiential Selfhood
There is a vast body of adherents from across the fields of 
philosophy, psychology and cognitive science to the view 
that conscious experience has an inalienable subjective char-
acter. That is, experience, in its most primitive and minimal 
form, is foundationally given to a subject in a phenomenally 
unique way. Whatever ‘I’ undergo in life, it is experientially 
manifest as for-me. Crucially for adherents of this view, 
such ‘for-me-ness’ is not a reflective or socially constructed 
achievement; rather, it is a pre-reflective, in-built feature 
of experience—an “adverbial modification” of any action 
(Rowlands 2013). As Zahavi (2014) summates:
for-me-ness[…] doesn’t refer to a specific experiential 
content, to a specific what[…] Rather, […it] refers to 
the distinct manner, or how of experiencing. It refers 
to the first-personal presence of all my experiential 
content; it refers to the experiential perspectivalness 
of phenomenal consciousness. (p. 22)2
1 Implicated, here, is the fact that I am not interested in focusing 
on logical (pre-) conditions of consciousness, but in the ontogenetic 
psychology of human consciousness. One may worry that this (i) 
assumes an empirical view of consciousness that is reducible to neu-
ropsychology, and/or (ii) turns a blind eye to transcendental phenom-
enology. However, it will become apparent that neither (i) nor (ii) is 
the case for interrelated reasons. Firstly, Sects. 3 and 4 will evidence 
focus on the dynamical and relational structure of consciousness, as 
a property of human beings considered holistically (i.e. as embod-
ied beings who are embedded in subject-dependent contexts and are 
therefore irreducible to descriptions that accord with some independ-
ent ‘objective’ reality). Secondly, as Gallagher (2018) argues, even if 
one believes that this approach amounts to ‘de-transcendentalising’ 
phenomenology, value can still be found in the ‘nature’ that is inves-
tigatively invoked. That is, if human consciousness is not taken to 
belong to a ‘nature’ of independent reality that is ultimately reducible 
to physics, but instead belongs to a ‘nature’ of inherent relationality 
between organisms and their environments, then phenomenological 
investigations can be ‘de-transcendentalised’ yet attentive to subjects’ 
(en)active and transformative roles in encountering worldly phenom-
ena. There are, of course, some big issues surrounding transcenden-
talism, naturalism and reduction at stake here, but I believe that my 
approach preserves philosophical relevance in virtue of highlighting 
the social pervasion of human consciousness from the perspective of 
ontogenesis (see Sects. 3 and 4) and thereby contributing to “a fuller 
and more holistic view of cognitive life” (Gallagher and Varela 2003, 
p. 19).
2 It should be noted that Guillot (2017) has distinguished notions of 
‘for-me-ness’, ‘me-ness’ and ‘mineness’ as, respectively: the special 
manner of being that an experience has for someone in virtue of it 
being uniquely given to her; the awareness of oneself that arises in 
virtue of living through an experience; the awareness of experience 
as one’s own. Importantly, for-me-ness does not seem to necessarily 
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This perspectival feature of phenomenal consciousness is 
claimed by Zahavi (2005, 2011, 2014, 2016, 2017, 2018) to 
be our most minimal aspect of selfhood. It does not directly 
involve an awareness of oneself, nor does it necessarily 
involve awareness of experiences as one’s own; rather, “[it] 
is part and parcel of any experiential episode qua its experi-
ential givenness” (Zahavi 2017, p. 196). It is, in other words, 
the special, sole access that a subject has to her experiences 
by the very fact of having them. As such, minimal experi-
ential selfhood is claimed to be a precondition for any more 
‘full-blown’ sense of self, such as a socially constructed or 
narrative self.
Over the last couple of decades, Zahavi has defended the 
notion of minimal selfhood from various objections.3 Below 
are the bare bones of some of the core qualities that Zahavi 
claims are vital to a proper understanding of minimal expe-
riential selfhood:
1. Within psychological and phenomenological literature, 
there are various long-standing empirically based theo-
ries (see Bonnier 1905; Merleau-Ponty 1964 for early 
accounts) which endorse the view that humans—even 
during pre-natal stages of development—have a basic 
bodily schema; that is, we have “a system of sensory-
motor capacities that function without [reflective] 
awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring” 
(Gallagher 2005, p. 24). Having a bodily schema allows 
one to orient oneself in space, maintain bodily posture 
and accomplish various movements without consciously 
monitoring or deliberatively attending to one’s body 
(ibid., pp. 19–30). In this sense, a bodily schema is a pre-
reflective experience of one’s physiological and organic 
presence. As we will see in Sect. 5, a bodily schema 
may be the source of our earliest consciousness. For 
Zahavi, what matters is that in spite of the pre-reflective 
nature of such a schema, it would be metaphysically 
and phenomenologically incorrect to characterise it as 
anonymous or impersonal. Rather, as with any form of 
consciousness, a bodily schema is uniquely given to the 
embodied subject in question; the pre-reflective bodily 
awareness is given for the subject, accessible to her in 
a way that it is not to others. A bodily schema, if it is to 
manifest our earliest consciousness, thus still involves 
the inalienable subjective character of minimal expe-
riential selfhood. This provides an ontogenetic avenue 
by which one can claim that minimal experiential self-
hood precedes any socially constructed dimension of 
self, in that claiming pre-reflective bodily self-aware-
ness necessarily depends on the involvement of others 
would be a radical stance to take.4 It would suggest that 
one’s body—and one’s experience of one’s body—is in 
some way not one’s own (although, as we will see in 
Sects. 3–5, there may be more to this seemingly para-
doxical claim than meets the eye). The very fact of being 
psychologically embodied therefore ostensibly supports 
the claim that minimal experiential selfhood ontogeneti-
cally precedes any social dimension of selfhood.
2. If one is tempted to argue that the pre-reflective aware-
ness of bodily schema, or any other dimension of con-
sciousness, amounts to some form of subjectivity, but 
not bona fide selfhood (e.g. Dreyfus 2007; Lane 2009; 
Lyrra 2009), then Zahavi’s response is that acceptance 
of subjective experience simply must simultaneously 
be acceptance of selfhood. That is, experience qua phe-
nomenal consciousness must be self-manifesting, and 
to claim that such self-manifestation only amounts to 
some form of ‘bare’ subjectivity is to distort the phe-
nomenological foundations of selfhood (Zahavi 2014, 
pp. 27–30). This is not to say that experience implicates 
‘self’ as an object, or as some supplementary quale to 
a conscious act; rather, “all experiences regardless of 
their object and regardless of their act-type (or attitu-
dinal character) are necessarily subjective in the sense 
that they feel like something for someone” (Zahavi 
2018, p. 6). As noted in Sect. 1, the self that emerges 
with each and every experience is thus truly minimal in 
that it is nothing more than the subjective givenness of 
experience (i.e. experiences are necessarily for some-
one). Without the reflexive nature of experience—the 
fact that it must be given to an experiencer in a unique 
3 See Ciaunica and Fotopoulou (2017), Garfield (2015), Kyselo 
(2016), and Ratcliffe (2017) for recent critiques.
4 Although radical, we will see in later sections that bodily self-
awareness may not necessarily depend on the involvement of oth-
ers, but human existence is such that there is good cause to endorse 
a view of the imbrication of our social and bodily (self-)experience 
from the very earliest moments of life.
entail me-ness or mineness—a fact exemplified by depersonalisa-
tion disorder, in which phenomenal awareness seems to lack subjec-
tive character of both one’s experiential presence and one’s experi-
ential ownership (ibid.). Nonetheless, depersonalised experiences 
are still given to subjects in a unique way and thus still have for-me-
ness. Indeed, for-me-ness pervades all occurrences of phenomenal 
consciousness (ibid). Thus, while Guillot’s distinction is important, 
it does not imminently reject the view that for-me-ness is our most 
minimal aspect of selfhood. Consequently, the view that I put forward 
in this paper applies to Guillot’s refined conception of ‘for-me-ness’ 
as well as to any conception that assumes the conjointness of for-me-
ness, me-ness and mineness. The point remains that, for human exist-
ence, no form of selfhood qua experience precedes one’s experience 




way—there is no perspectival or access-based distinc-
tion between the experiential states of one individual 
(or ‘self’) and another. To experience at all is to be pre-
reflectively aware of having a perspective on the world.
3. In spite of the notion that minimal experiential selfhood 
is an “invariant” quality that is an in-built characteristic 
of all experience (Zahavi 2014, p. 66), it amounts to 
more than merely claiming that every subject is numer-
ically distinct. This is done by fully appreciating the 
subjective character of minimal experiential selfhood. 
That is, whilst a critic may, from an observer’s stance, 
contend that one experiential life differs from another 
simply because one experiential life unfolds ‘over here’ 
and another ‘over there’, the same trivial distinction can-
not be made from a truly subjective stance. For instance, 
if we suppose that two twins, who are type-identical in 
terms of their psychological and physical properties, are 
staring at the same wall, such that the externally deter-
mined content of their experience is type-identical, then 
from an observer’s perspective it may seem reasonable 
to claim that the difference between the experiences of 
these two twins is one of numerical distinction, but not 
one of qualitativeness (Zahavi 2014). However, Zahavi 
(2014) explains that if we assume the first-person per-
spective of one of these twins, then despite the type-
identicality of the content of experience, the self-mani-
festation of experience will still be unique to each twin. 
Due to the inherent ‘for-me-ness’ that, in a fundamental 
manner, acts as an individuating characteristic, the first 
twin’s experience will have a reflexive subjective pres-
ence that may be quite unlike the second twin’s (ibid.). 
To deny this would be to suggest that the eradication of 
one of the twins would simply amount to the eradication 
of a duplicate experiential life, but, from the perspec-
tive of the twin himself, this is of course not the case. 
The foundation of the very subjectivity of experience 
amounts to a pre-reflective awareness of one’s own con-
sciousness, which acquaints one uniquely with one’s 
own experiential life during all instances of phenomenal 
awareness.
Taking the points from 1 to 3 together, we can see that 
minimal experiential selfhood is claimed to underlie and 
constitute all forms of experiential life. In spite of this, it is 
not intended to result in an isolating account of selfhood: 
Zahavi (2015, 2016, 2017) has been at pains to note that a 
full account of selfhood should be ‘multidimensional’ and 
should include various “dimensions of selfhood that are 
intrinsically interpersonally co-constituted” (2016, p. 1067). 
Yet this does not mean, for Zahavi, that one’s most basic 
form of selfhood depends on others, is derived from others, 
or is constituted by others. Before even considering sociality, 
one can return to the idea that minimal experiential selfhood 
is an in-built feature of conscious life that accompanies any 
other dimension of selfhood, from our first moments of 
existence through to our last.
3  No Others, No Dice
In the remainder of the paper, I intend to show that as far 
as the lived manifestation of human existence is concerned, 
minimal experiential selfhood—the for-me-ness of experi-
ence—is de facto co-emergent with minimal relational self-
hood—the co-constitution of experience through engage-
ments with others. The argument does not reject minimal 
experiential selfhood, but it does reject a view of it as a 
singular ‘core’ or primordial foundation to actualised human 
selfhood. Instead, ‘for-me-ness’ is co-emergent with the 
social modulation of human experience.
A key aspect of this central argument is that, in its ‘thin-
nest’ form, minimal experiential selfhood amounts to a for-
mal condition of any consciousness, but one that fails to 
singularly capture essential characteristics of human con-
sciousness. Once one grounds one’s investigations as begin-
ning from the embodied subjectivity of human existence, 
one finds that minimal experiential selfhood is conjoint with 
a minimal relational form of selfhood.
There are two features of this claim that merit prefatory 
exposition. Firstly, the claim is not merely stating that there 
is more to human selfhood than the perspectival ‘for-me-
ness’ of experience. Nor is it a mundane exegesis of the 
manner in which human selfhood is bound up with the lives 
of others. Rather, the idea is that once one’s subject matter 
is the phenomenology of human individuals, the co-consti-
tution of any individual’s experience by other humans can-
not play second-fiddle to any other aspect of selfhood. So, 
although minimal experiential selfhood is essential to the 
very nature of our being, so, too, is the relational aspect 
of our being. That is, the relational aspect of our being, in 
which we are co-constituted by experiential interactions with 
others, is neither preceded by, nor explanatorily inferior to, 
minimal experiential selfhood. The second prefatory point 
to the claim is that the description of minimal experiential 
selfhood as “conjoint” with minimal relational selfhood is 
intended to capture the developmental co-emergence and 
proportionate importance of these two dimensions of self-
hood. However, the two dimensions should not be viewed 
as interdependent, nor should one dimension be viewed as 
derived from the other.5 Instead, the claim highlights the 
5 Conversely, the two dimensions of selfhood should not be seen as 
two distinct ‘selves’. Rather, they are the essential aspects of what 
Zahavi (2014) refers to as a ‘multidimensional account of selfhood’. 
As noted, these two dimensions are not interdependent, but they are 
inevitably interconnected and co-emergent as far as human ontogen-
esis is concerned.
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de-facto co-existence of the two dimensions in the normal 
course of human development, such that they are inevitably 
interconnected and both necessary for an account of human 
selfhood.
With these two prefatory points in tow, we can move onto 
the first stage of reasoning, which arises from questioning 
just how ‘thin’ we can take minimal experiential selfhood to 
be. As far as Zahavi (2017) is concerned, minimal experien-
tial selfhood is the “thinnest” form of self and “a condition 
of possibility for […any] interpersonally constituted mini-
mal self” (p. 197). This is because regardless of the worldly 
constitution of the content of consciousness—social or 
otherwise—the how of experiencing is an ever-present and 
underlying feature of the very possibility of having expe-
riences (Zahavi 2005, 2014, 2016, 2017). In other words, 
minimal experiential selfhood is not concerned with what 
is experienced in terms of intentional act-types and the phe-
nomenality of objects, but how it is subjectively manifest 
(Zahavi 2014, 2017).
The problem with this is that there is a danger of con-
ceptualising this form of selfhood as so ‘thin’ that it loses 
its phenomenological value. For instance, if it were to be 
considered an isolable dimension of selfhood, then mini-
mal experiential selfhood is no more than a theoretical pre-
condition for consciousness. That is, its status is one of a 
logically necessary condition as regards the emergence of 
any consciousness.6 However, once one’s concern is the 
manifestation of lived human consciousness, then minimal 
experiential selfhood cannot be a stand-alone dimension of 
existence. What I mean by this is that for-me-ness is always 
bound up with the what-it-is-like-ness of lived experience. 
Thus, as Zahavi (2014) himself asserts, for-me-ness is 
always an adverbial modification of experience, such that it 
is inevitably tied into “what-it-is-like-for-me-ness” (p. 19). 
As we will see throughout this section, once one moves away 
from the purely theoretical realm of logical dependencies 
and ‘thickens’ minimal experiential selfhood to this mean-
ingful phenomenological level in which it is bound to the 
qualitative dimension of selfhood, one then has grounds 
from which to establish that minimal experiential selfhood 
must be developmentally conjoint with minimal relational 
selfhood.
As a first pass on this idea, consider that as long as con-
sciousness, including minimal experiential selfhood, is not 
some form of transcendent Cartesian ego, but is naturalisti-
cally embodied (as Zahavi 2016 suggests himself), then even 
the ‘how’ of experiencing must inhere in an embodied sub-
ject. Put simply, the body is the site of conscious being—it 
is in and through the body that what-it-is-like-for-me-ness 
is present—and this fact should not be ignored even if one is 
seeking the ‘thinnest’ account of selfhood that is available. 
This is significant because, in a response to Ratcliffe (2017), 
Zahavi (2017) claims that if we want to ‘locate’ minimal 
experiential selfhood then we should not review what is 
experienced, but how it is experienced (i.e. how it is for me). 
For Zahavi, the how of experience is ‘located’ in the subjec-
tive dimension (i.e. for-me-ness) of experience, rather than 
the qualitative dimension (i.e. what-it-is-like-ness) of expe-
rience. Yet this is clearly a very particular interpretation of 
‘location’. It seems that if we want to naturalistically account 
for experience then we should not side-step the issue of spa-
tio-temporal locality. Indeed, if we endeavour to address the 
matter of the spatio-temporal location of experience, then, in 
a broad manner, it seems safe to say that both the ‘what’ and 
‘how’ of experience must fall within the purview of embod-
ied being. As such, the body must be accorded a central role 
in any account of consciousness and, importantly, this means 
that the social modulation and connoting of the lived body, 
which we will look at in more detail over the subsequent two 
sections, must also be taken seriously.
It is important to stress that this grounding of experience 
in the (socially influenced) body applies not only to bod-
ily intentionality, but also to the pre-reflective awareness of 
minimal experiential selfhood. Indeed, one can go so far as 
to claim that if minimal experiential selfhood is grounded 
in embodied being (encompassing the temporal dimension 
of the body), then although its presence may be invariant 
(i.e. the fact that it is given to a subject), the manner of its 
presence (i.e. the manner of its givenness) must not be, as a 
consequence of the unceasing mutability of the body.7
If one wishes to deny this and focus on nothing other than 
the very fact of the givenness of experiential selfhood, then, 
as alluded to earlier, it seems that one is only addressing a 
transcendental feature of consciousness—a mere condition 
of possibility. This is no doubt why Zahavi (2017) contends 
that minimal experiential selfhood is the “thinnest” form 
of selfhood, but in this guise it is in fact so ‘thin’ that it 
amounts to no more than a pre-condition for being. ‘Pre-
condition’, here, is appropriate because, to reiterate, minimal 
experientialism is posited as an essential feature of all forms 
6 As Zahavi (2014) points out, there are of course phenomenological 
repercussions to this for-me-ness, rather than it being merely a logi-
cal claim. However, these phenomenological repercussions only arise 
once the focus of analysis shifts to the actual emergence of conscious-
ness. At the purely theoretical level of logical dependencies, for-me-
ness carries minimal phenomenological weight in the sense of offer-
ing us subjective perspectivalness, but no further insights into the 
actual nature of human being-in-the-world.
7 This claim becomes highly relevant in the next two sections, in 
which we consider evidence for one’s corporeality being experien-
tially modulated through bodily interactions with others.
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of subjectivity, for all conscious beings (Zahavi 2014, p. 14), 
but it is undeniably relevant for human selfhood that experi-
ence is always socially immersed (again, this point will be 
developed in subsequent sections). The very ‘thinnest’ con-
sideration of minimal experiential selfhood—as an in-built 
feature of consciousness across all its organismic manifesta-
tions—amounts to a formal pre-condition for the inevitably 
ensocialled manifestation of human consciousness. But as 
soon as this pre-condition is rightfully considered as actually 
embodied by a human subject, who is experientially engaged 
with others in a fundamental manner, it is bound up with 
the ensocialled world. In Sects. 4 and 5, we will see that this 
social ‘binding’ takes place at the burgeoning moments of 
human consciousness, in such a way that human life cannot 
but be socially constituted and this social constitution is not 
preceded by any other dimension of selfhood. Such a stance 
moves beyond theoretical conditionals to rightfully imbue 
embodiment with social meaning in a manner that is lack-
ing from existing accounts of selfhood. As embodied, one’s 
lived subjectivity is always a lived bodily subjectivity. And 
as a sense of self emerges and develops, one’s body—and 
its role in affective and cognitive behaviour—is modulated 
through interactions with others, both in terms of behav-
ioural direction and the social meaning that is etched into 
such behavioural direction. In a notable sense, then, one’s 
corporeality is partly given over to others: it is co-constituted 
in social engagements. Ignoring this fact would be to distort 
the very first-person perspective that Zahavi rightly insists 
we take seriously, reducing it to a kind of propaedeutic of 
human being.
Putting this idea into a thematic description, we can say 
that human experience, at its burgeoning foundations, is 
characterised as what-it-is-like-for-me-through-you-ness. 
This is obviously somewhat cumbersome phrasing, but it 
is an important description. The whole purpose of Zahavi 
describing experience as “what-it-is-like-for-me-ness” (e.g. 
Zahavi 2014, p. 19) is to emphasise that ‘for-me-ness’ is 
an inescapable subjective dimension of experience—its 
“persisting dative of manifestation” (ibid.). What I think we 
should add to this is the social inescapability of human expe-
rience: the fact that human experience is manifest ‘through-
others’. As we will see in subsequent sections, this feature 
is inevitable in human existence. It is not a mere addendum 
to conscious experience, but rather an existentiale of being 
human, which, if denied, leaves one stranded in a realm of 
pure theoria. It is only by taking seriously our actual pres-
ence as living embodied beings, who are socially co-con-
stituted in a foundational way, that we can have a proper—
appropriately ‘thick’—phenomenology of human selfhood.
Note that none of this runs counter to minimal experien-
tial selfhood per se, in the sense of rejecting the omnipresent 
for-me-ness of experience. Rather, the argument is simply 
that once minimal experiential selfhood is treated not as a 
theoretical condition for any form of conscious being, but 
as an actualised feature of human existence, then we should 
ease away from characterising it as some sort of separable 
‘core’, or ‘ontogenetically primitive’ aspect of selfhood. 
Instead, it is tied to other dimensions of experience and its 
diachronic equiprimordiality with a minimally relational 
self—that emerges through socially ensconced bodily inter-
actions—should be acknowledged.
4  The Shared Experiential States of Early 
Life
Having outlined the claim that minimal experiential selfhood 
should be treated as equiprimordial with minimal relational 
selfhood, this section will advance arguments for why we 
should take there to be a ‘minimal’ relational dimension 
of selfhood in the first place. Building on work by Krueger 
(2013, 2015),8 I will suggest that phenomenality is often 
socially constituted in virtue of shared experiential states, 
i.e. numerically single experiences that are given to more 
than one subject. These experiential states are socially con-
stituted by co-participating subjects such that the scope, 
rhythm and feel of experience is affected by the bodily 
dynamics of the involved subjects. Selfhood, including its 
minimal experiential dimension, emerges within and through 
this socially constituted world.
Importantly, this is not a prosaic claim that certain experi-
ences will only arise courtesy of others. Rather, the claim 
modestly states that our capacity to share experiences is 
prevalent during the burgeoning moments of life and there-
fore can be viewed as foundational to subsequent experien-
tial episodes.
To begin the exposition of our phenomenal co-constitu-
tion, consider the striking dependence on others of humans 
during the first moments of post-natal life. Unlike many 
other animals, human newborns do not skilfully exercise 
their limbs, nor do they display the behavioural dexterity or 
survival capabilities of precocial, and even most altricial, 
species. Instead, human newborns are largely helpless, with 
survival only being guaranteed through the keen attention 
of caregivers. As a result of this dependence on caregiv-
ers, the direction and scope of neonatal experience is pre-
dominantly determined by social interactions. For example, 
Krueger (2013) describes how breastfeeding, which is a 
relatively complex social interaction that typically occurs 
8 Krueger’s (2013, 2015) primary concern is shared emotions, rather 
than selfhood. Whilst the content of his papers suggests likely sympa-
thy with the stance on selfhood presented in this paper, my argument 
ultimately goes further by (i) addressing the very earliest emergence 
of consciousness, and (ii) endorsing the social permeation of bodily 
self-awareness.
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within the first hour or so after birth, involves “a structured 
turn-taking, attention-directing character shaped largely 
by the mother “jiggling” the infant as a prompt to resume 
feeding” (p. 516; see also Kaye 1982). Whilst the newborn 
is clearly (and significantly) not completely passive in this 
interaction, the direction of her attention and the general 
scope of the experience are controlled by the mother’s tactile 
encouragement and reciprocation of the newborn’s needs. 
Similarly, if we consider other neonatal behavioural accom-
plishments, such as imitation of facial movements (Meltzoff 
and Moore 1983; Gallagher and Meltzoff 1996), imitation of 
hand movements (Nagy et al. 2005), orientation and prefer-
ence towards maternal voice (Standley and Madsen 1990; 
DeCasper and Fifer 1980), preference for direct gazes (Far-
roni et al. 2002; Guellai et al. 2015), preference for ‘happy’ 
faces (Farroni et al. 2007), and attunement to responsive and 
reciprocating expressions (Filippetti et al. 2013; Meltzoff 
and Moore 1983; Nagy 2008), then it is notable that these 
interactions tend to be contextually guided and regulated 
by the authoritative role of the participating adult. What we 
find is that the interactive behaviours of caregivers seem 
to solicit kinaesthetic possibilities from neonates, such that 
there is a dynamic and bodily ‘coupling’ between neonate 
and caregiver (Krueger 2013).
At this early juncture, one may protest that all the afore-
mentioned behavioural studies demonstrate is that there is 
dynamic physical coordination and close causal influence 
during social interactions—something that no one would 
want to deny. However, the claim that I want to endorse is 
that these neonate–caregiver interactions are more than mere 
causal reciprocity and, from the perspective of experience, 
are in fact genuinely shared in the sense that they dynami-
cally span the bodily behaviour of neonate and caregiver 
(ibid.). Such joint corporeality amounts to not only the con-
tent of experience being phenomenally possible as a result 
of mutual engagement, but also the manner of experiencing 
only manifesting through dyadic constitution. This results 
from the mutual enactment of a congruous social domain 
that is generated through the physical and affective regu-
latory guidance of a caregiver and the guided responsive-
ness of a neonate. Key to the generation and maintenance 
of such a social domain is the fact that, unlike adult humans, 
the attentional capability of neonates is largely exogenous, 
that is, determined by the unwilled excitation that results 
from various worldly stimuli (Posner and Rothbart 1998). 
Consequently, neonates’ attention is heavily dependent on 
caregivers’ tactile encouragement, gestural patterns, eye con-
tact, gaze orientation and postural directing, amounting to 
“exogenous scaffolding that[…] allows the infant to exceed 
her developmental constraints and achieve a flexibility and 
stability of attention well beyond her current developmental 
level” (Krueger 2013, p. 516). In other words, the regulatory 
interaction of the caregiver and responsive neonate produce 
a social system that is functionally shared.9 Crucially, this 
shared social system, which is exogenously attended to from 
the neonate’s perspective, unearths a novel phenomenologi-
cal insight; namely, that neonates’ socially directed attention 
within a coupled interaction is properly co-constituted by 
another’s involvement (ibid.).
This idea requires the exposition of two points:
(a) Firstly, there is the fact that attentional control is an 
integral part of first-personal consciousness: the capac-
ity to selectively attend to specific aspects of the world 
is essential to actively shaping one’s experience (Krue-
ger 2013). Such selective attention imbues experience 
with an unquestionable degree of ‘mineness’—an 
appreciation that there is agential power involved in 
what is engaged with.10 This is not to say that one has 
one-way control over what is attended to, but that one’s 
self-directed agency is an integral constituent—in con-
junction with a world that affords certain actions—in 
experiencing the world subjectively. Without atten-
tional control, one’s experience is not brought forth 
as a kind of matching process between one’s present 
cognitive state and the possibilities for action offered 
by the current situational context, but is instead deter-
mined unilaterally by worldly happenings. Subjective 
choice is simply removed from the picture if attentional 
control is absent. The capacity for endogenous atten-
tion is therefore central to securing a sense of agency 
for consciousness, and as this attention is seemingly 
lacking in neonatal life, it is likely that neonates “lack 
the feeling of stable perspectival selfhood” (Krueger 
2013, p. 518).
  This does not mean that neonates lack any sense of 
selfhood—they are still subjects with rich experiential 
lives. Rather, they lack the kind of autonomous control 
over a crucial feature of selfhood that human adults 
have and rely on caregivers as agential surrogates until 
their psychological potential is further developed. The 
point is that such agential surrogacy can be construed 
9 Further evidence for this can be found from the ‘still face’ experi-
ment, in which neonates display unease and irritation at mothers 
adopting expressionless faces in the midst of interactions (Weinberg 
and Tronick 1996). The claim is that the neonates’ irritation results 
from expectation of a certain kind of dynamic bodily resonance that 
is dyadically manifest through interaction, and which has been sedi-
mented in the neonates’ “intercorporeal memory” through previous 
interactions (Fuchs 2016).
10 This agential selection of experiential attention is clearly a richer 
notion of ‘self’ than that required for minimal experiential selfhood. 
However, at this stage, I am merely developing Krueger’s work so 
as to illustrate the early-life presence of shared experiences. Later in 
this section, and in Sect. 5, we will see how no aspect of experience 
emerges developmentally prior to socially constituted experience.
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as a form of shared experience (there will be more on 
this shortly), and as neonate–caregiver interactions are 
the earliest experiences that any human undergoes, it 
follows that these shared experiences should be consid-
ered foundational to any full-blown, multidimensional 
sense of selfhood.
(b) Complementary to the important role of attentional 
control is the fact that the exogenous direction pro-
vided by a caregiver amounts to actually entering into 
the phenomenality of the neonate’s experience. As we 
have seen in the preceding paragraphs—and as is evi-
dent from the simple observation of neonate–caregiver 
interactions—there is a kind of systemic congruence of 
movement and posture when a caregiver is attending to 
a neonate (e.g. during breastfeeding). Importantly, there 
is also a kind of systemic emotional11 congruence. The 
reasoning behind this can be put as follows: due to the 
fact that neonates lack endogenous attentional control, 
they also lack endogenous emotional control, and this 
means that they are phenomenally poised to experi-
ence the emotions of their caregivers (Krueger 2013). 
Although we have already seen an argument for the 
lack of neonatal attentional control, it will now be nec-
essary to briefly consider the second and third stages 
in the aforementioned reasoning.
When it comes to emotions, it is common to think of 
them as involuntarily occurring states. However, it is more 
apt to think of them as experiences that are, at least in part, 
subjectively controlled (ibid.; Solomon 2004). For instance, 
as Krueger (2013) explains, one may be angered by some 
worldly event, but the unfolding of the experience of anger 
is not unilaterally determined by the world. Instead, one has 
the agential capacity, even whilst gripped by anger, to sus-
tain the event “by willfully assuming a particular posture or 
stance[…or] focusing on specific anger-inducing aspects of 
the situation” (ibid., p. 518), or, alternatively, to quell the 
anger “by willfully adopting a more placid posture, breath-
ing slowly, and directing[…] attention to pleasant things” 
(ibid.). Similarly, one may attempt to intensify an experience 
of joy by openly embracing it through physical expression—
throwing ones arms in the air, clapping and whooping—or 
one may attempt to silence it by shunning such celebratory 
actions and assuming a reserved demeanour. Whilst they are 
often involuntarily incurred, emotional experiences there-
fore still involve an important degree of agential guidance. 
Crucially, this agential guidance goes hand in hand with 
attentional control: one can inhibit or intensify one’s affec-
tive responses by attending to the situation in a specific way 
(Krueger 2013). Thus, neonatal lack of endogenous atten-
tional control results in a lack of endogenous emotional 
control.
In virtue of lacking endogenous emotional control, neo-
nates are openly susceptible to the modulatory emotional 
experience of caregivers (ibid.). To exemplify this, consider 
a mother playing a ‘game’ with her newborn, in which she 
leans forward and nuzzles her child before moving back and 
then repeating the action. The movements may be accompa-
nied by ‘motherese’ statements (e.g. “Who’s a pretty girl?”, 
“Aren’t you clever?”, “Isn’t mummy silly?”, etc.), smiling, 
and encouraging head movements. In response, the newborn 
will be induced into smiling, vocalising (e.g. laughing) and 
playfully moving her body. As noted earlier, in spite of the 
newborn’s lack of endogenous control, the mother’s actions 
are not one-way directives, but are sensitive responses to 
the newborn’s behaviour. The ‘game’ is thus a kind of dia-
logue: an expressive give-and-take of attuned movements. 
Thanks to the innate disposition for capacities such as facial 
imitation, neonates are poised to enter into such intersub-
jective ‘dialogues’, wherein their other-induced imitations 
and expressive responses are reciprocated and further engen-
dered by caregiver responses (Reddy 2008). Neonate and 
caregiver thus collectively form a dyadic system in which 
the unfolding of the interaction cannot be individualisti-
cally attributed to either of them (cf. De Jaegher and Di 
Paolo (2007)). Moreover, as expressive mimicry gener-
ates corresponding emotional states (Kugiumutzakis et al. 
2005; Zlatev 2008), such bodily expressed intersubjective 
dialogues entail a form of “mutual affective resonance” 
(Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009, p. 478), in which we find “a 
finely tuned coordination of movements, rhythmic synchrony 
and mirroring of affective expressions” (ibid.). In this way, 
mother and child enter into, sustain and regulate a shared 
physical, affective and experiential domain for which they 
are simultaneously constituent and constituting participants. 
Notably, however, as the mother is the only participant with 
the capacity for endogenous control, it is her behaviour that 
is leading the expressive contours, postural rhythm and 
cadence of the co-constituted interaction (Krueger 2013). 
Once more, the newborn is not completely inert or lack-
ing any form of regulatory agency within these interactions, 
but she is exogenously open to the physical and affective 
modulation of the mother/caregiver. Resultantly, neonates 
are affectively excited and moulded by caregiver behaviour 
within co-constituted interactions, in such a way that the 
very phenomenality of the neonate’s experience is intersub-
jectively evoked and parameterised (ibid.). The neonate can, 
at best, assume the role of “an assistant” in her own affective 
regulation (Taipale 2016).
Although clear cases of emotional sharing, such as the 
above mother–child ‘game’, are more prevalent several 
weeks or months after birth, one can speculate that the 
11 Throughout this paper, I am using the terms ‘emotion’ and ‘affect’, 
and their derivatives, interchangeably.
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immediate pre-birth cuddling, rocking and soothing that is 
generally part and parcel of ostensibly physical interactions, 
such as breastfeeding or the external regulation of neonatal 
temperature through bodily contact with caregivers (Hofer 
1994), may already contain important affective components. 
They are, at the very least, preparatory experiences for the 
manifestation of the kinds of shared affective interactions 
that we have looked at thus far, and which are an impor-
tant feature of early-life phenomenal consciousness. Within 
every shared experience, we find that the caregiver not only 
enables the unfolding of certain experiential content, but 
also plays a regulatory role in how this experience is mani-
fest, encompassing the very process of experiential taxon-
omy (Krueger 2013; Merleau-Ponty 1964).
Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that many of 
the qualities that are taken to be our ‘most human’—love, 
passion, camaraderie, memory, rationalisation—ontogeneti-
cally require the leveraging of shared experiences.12 That is, 
subjects often go beyond expected capacities by co-creating 
and co-modulating collective domains of social organisation 
that are irreducible to any subject considered individualisti-
cally (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). Indeed, Tomasello 
and Carpenter (2007) suggest that it is our capacity to share 
experiences (or, as they phrase it, ‘share intentionality’) that 
transforms our early cognitive development into something 
uniquely ‘human’, distinct from the social skills of gaze fol-
lowing, manipulation, group activity, and intersubjective 
learning that we share with other primates. When we share 
experiences, we move beyond individualistic possibilities 
because, in a notable sense, our physical and affective states 
fall partially under the control of (an) other(s), such that 
moods and cognition come to be co-constituted. This is in 
keeping with Merleau-Ponty’s (1964) notion of intercorpo-
reality (and Fuch’s (2016) entailed notion of interaffectivity), 
wherein subjects’ intentions ‘inhabit’ one another’s bodies, 
leading to mutually modified entwining of the physical and 
affective expressions and reactions that encapsulate an expe-
rience. This entwinement, or co-constitution, could give rise 
to new experiences that were hitherto phenomenally alien.
Whilst this clearly would not exactly mirror the dyadic 
shared experiences of neonates and caregivers, it certainly 
seems plausible that the exogenous openness of infancy 
may still be active, perhaps in an attenuated form, in certain 
mature interactions.
5  Reconsidering Minimal Experiential 
Selfhood
It may seem that although the experiential world may be 
socially modulated and influenced from early moments 
of existence, this does not alter the fact that our very first 
experiences—regardless of their worldly nature—involve 
an in-built reflexive dimension (i.e. for-me-ness) that will 
accompany us throughout life. Why, then, should minimal 
relationality be accorded equal importance as regards human 
ontogenesis?
In Sect. 3, the first prong of a forked response to this 
question was outlined: without the socially co-constituted 
dimension of selfhood, minimal experientialism fails to cap-
ture essential characteristics of human life and is confined to 
a realm of pure theoria. Yet, for this to hold true, we require 
the second prong of the response: no human experience 
manifests prior to socially co-constituted experience. This 
requires the argument that the exogenous social guidance 
of human experience is present with the very earliest signs 
of life. Of course, until we have exact neurobiological cor-
relates of consciousness, it is impossible to pinpoint exactly 
when consciousness emerges. However, if we run with the 
idea that the earliest sense of self is most likely pre-reflective 
bodily self-awareness, as noted in Sect. 2, then I believe that 
one can make a case for this simultaneously being a kind of 
co-constituted awareness, in virtue of the social permeation 
of the body.
The very earliest signs of bodily self-awareness are evi-
dent at 6–14 weeks of gestation through activity of vestibu-
lar nuclei, which, amongst other roles, are essential to the 
integration of head position, eye movements and bodily 
orientation (Gallagher 2005; Jouen and Gapenne 1995). 
If this amounts to any form of ‘self’, then, in accordance 
with the arguments presented in Sect. 2, it must involve the 
pre-reflective for-me-ness of experience. However, what 
we should also consider is the driving force behind this 
vestibular nuclei activation. Assuming we follow common 
sense, the ‘driving force’ is naturally the uterine environ-
ment in which the foetus is found and through which all 
foetal sensory stimulation is filtered. More than being merely 
physico-biologically dependent on this uterine environment, 
the foetus is also experientially dependent on this environ-
ment (once again, this is under the hypothesis that some 
form of experience is actually manifest). Inasmuch as this 
environment is provided by an ‘other’ (i.e. the mother), there 
seems to be social (exogenous) modulation from the outset 
of being. In other words, there is a kind of inter-modality 
12 Indeed, taking this claim to its extreme, we can entertain the pos-
sibility of a neonate who, from the point of insemination, is kept alive 
in a strictly ‘artificial’ manner (i.e. brought to term ex-utero in an 
artificial womb and nourished through artificial feeding tubes, whilst 
ostracised from any social contact). Such a being may well have some 
form of self-awareness (e.g. for-me-ness), but it is unlikely that one 
would refer to it as ‘human’ as anything more than a biological cate-
gorisation (which I also believe would be the case with alleged claims 
involving feral ‘children’). The real-time, embodied nature of early-
life interactions with other humans is not only crucial to the physi-
cal and emotional scope and manner of experience, but also, specula-
tively, to the development of recognisable ‘human’ capabilities.
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between bodily and social awareness.13 Indeed, the prefer-
ences that neonates display for their native language (Moon 
et al. 1993) and for the sight (Bushnell et al. 1989), smell 
(Marlier et al. 1998; Varendi and Porter 2001) and sound of 
their mothers (Standley and Madsen 1990; DeCasper and 
Fifer 1980), immediately after and perhaps even prior to 
birth (Marx and Nagy 2015), are suggestive of the fact that 
the experiential world of any human—in terms of dispo-
sitions, sensitivities and predilections—is already socially 
shaped during foetal development. With the phenomenality 
of consciousness being accumulative, in the sense of impli-
cating one’s historicity, any and all subsequent experiences 
are lived through the basis of this primary social modulation. 
And such social modulation is not limited to overt sensori-
motor behaviour: Ciaunica and Fotopoulou (2017) describe 
how the multisensory integration responsible for interocep-
tive capacities is also exogenously regulated through early-
life social interactions. So, although bodily self-awareness is 
not preceded by any kind of socially implicated awareness, it 
is also not clear that bodily self-awareness precedes socially 
modulated (self-)awareness.14 The experiential world, it 
seems, is foundationally shaped by others during the same 
tentative moments in which a sense of bodily self-awareness 
is developed.
Although this social co-constitution of neonatal life may 
not be an innate feature of consciousness like minimal expe-
riential selfhood, in the sense that one could, in theory if 
nothing else, survive through inorganic assistance, it does 
seem that intersubjective dispositions and engagements are 
connate in the normal course of human life. A minimally 
relational sense of self thus appears equiprimordially, in 
terms of development and foundational importance, with a 
minimally experiential sense of self.
6  Conclusion: Clutching at ‘Thinness’?
Whilst the preceding sections have demonstrated that the 
notion of a minimal relational self should not be dismissed, 
there is reason to suspect that Zahavi may still advocate 
minimal experiential selfhood as ‘thinner’. This suspicion 
is derived from Zahavi’s (2017) recent response to Ratcliffe 
(2017) and Ciaunica and Fotopoulou (2017), who argue 
for the interdependence of subjective and intersubjective 
experience. These arguments, respectively, endorse (a) the 
intersubjective constitution of one’s intentional modalities, 
such that the general incorrigibility of one’s remembering, 
imagining or perceiving is developmentally dependent upon 
(and sustained in adulthood by) the social validation of oth-
ers (Ratcliffe 2017), and (b) the idea that selfhood is derived 
from proximal interactions and physical contact with others 
during post-natal life, in virtue of neonates’ indiscriminate 
schematization of bodily movements and synchronous states 
that are ‘amodally’ determined by a caregiver (Ciaunica and 
Fotopoulou 2017). There is naturally much to be said and 
discussed about each of these views, but even the titular 
descriptions that I have provided are indicative of their close 
affinity to the position that has been presented throughout 
this paper. What matters for present purposes is Zahavi’s 
(2017) response to both of these views: that the aforemen-
tioned authors are missing a “crucial element” (p. 194) of 
minimal experiential selfhood, i.e. what matters is the sub-
jective givenness of any conscious episode that precedes any 
other form of selfhood—not what is experienced, but how it 
is experienced (Zahavi 2014, 2017). In other words, Zahavi 
returns to his stance that any conscious episode has a fun-
damentally reflexive character, notwithstanding engagement 
in social interaction.
This response facilitates the opportunity to further clarify 
the position of this paper. Firstly, unlike Ratcliffe’s focus on 
intentional attitudes, Sect. 4 directly addresses the shared 
experiential nature of human life in terms of the broad mani-
festation and scope of experience, rather than the mode of 
intention. Secondly, unlike Ciaunica and Fotopoulou, the 
suggestion is not that minimal selfhood is derived from 
social interactions, but that the reflexive character of experi-
ence (which is not to be denied) is manifest equiprimordially 
with the social permeation of experience. In other words, the 
earliest signs of selfhood seem to manifest in tandem with 
socially exogenous constitution of experience. And unlike 
both theories, the position of this paper does not argue for 
the interdependence of intersubjectivity and subjectivity, in 
that minimal experiential selfhood could theoretically exist 
without minimal relational selfhood. However, retreating to 
its ‘thinnest’ theoretical basis divorces minimal experiential 
selfhood from the lived reality of embodied humans.
Thus, whilst the need to appreciate the minimal experi-
ential dimension of the self is both pressing and pivotal to a 
proper phenomenological understanding of existence, mini-
mal experientialism should not uniquely hold court as an 
ontogenetically primordial or pre-eminent ‘core’ of human 
selfhood. Instead, the minimal experiential aspect of self 
should be entwined at all times with a minimal relational 
aspect of self. This latter aspect of self manifests through the 
fact that others are developmental consociates (Schütz 1967) 
13 It may in fact be more appropriate to speak of intra-modality, here, 
in the sense that ‘bodily’ and ‘social’ worlds are seemingly insepara-
bly entwined (see Higgins 2017).
14 If one were to take a more conservative view of selfhood based 
on the fact that the thalamo-cortical complex, which is considered 
an integral neural correlate of consciousness (Koch 2004), does not 
begin to develop until 24–28 weeks of gestation and is not fully inte-
grated until roughly 2 months later (ibid.)—a point at which many of 
the social abilities that have been noted are functionally ready—then 
it would seem that the bedrock of the social world is already in place 
when self-awareness emerges.
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in any human’s being, with this co-constituted existence 
forming the experiential bedrock for the unfolding of life.
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